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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK LOAN COMPANY,
a Utah corp oration,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 15324

vs.

JOHN CLAIR MILLER,
Defendant and Respondent.
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK LOAN COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 15325

vs.

PETER S. LEVATICH,
Defendant and Respondent.
DEFEND.""NT-APPELLEES' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These are companion cases by Producers Livestock Loan
Compan;' (hereinafter "Producers"), a Utah corporation, to recover an asserted indebtedness of John Clair Miller and Peter
S. Levatich, defendant-appellees, both of whom are residents
cf Ne1-1 York State.

Process was served upon defendants in New

'i<Jr\: State, pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute (UTAH CODE
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ANN. §78-27-22, et seq.

(1977 Repl. Vol.)).

Defendant-appellee

deny plaintiff's claim of indebtedness and further deny the
sertion of personal jurisdiction over them in the State of ~t,
(Plaintiff's substantive claim is identical to the claim whicr.
it is asserting by counterclaim in Levatich and Miller v. Pro·
ducers Livestock Loan Co., et al., No. 77-CV-301 in the

Unite~

States District Court for the Northern District of New York,,
pending action by Messrs. Levatich and Miller for securities
fraud.)
Defendants moved to dismiss this action for lack of
personal jurisdiction, pursuant to the terms of UTAII R. CI'.'·
12 (b) (2), and for insufficiencv of process and service of pro·
cess, pursuant to the terms of UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4),(5)
The district court granted the motion.

Plaintiff appealed.

~-

May 26, 1978, this Court, in a divided decision, reversedtha:.
judgment.

Appel lees move for rehearing, respectfully urginr,

that the plurality opinion was erroneous and that, if left
standing, that opinion would create serious inconsistencies::
the Utah law of agency and of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The record herein reveals that defendants have never
transacted business in Utah (~. 6. M., 8. L.); that they were
solicited to execute promissory notes (which represented the::
·
·ff) i.·n New York State and made
allege d indebtedness to p 1 ai.nti.
8
application for those notes in New York State (~. 6 · !!. ' ·
and that the proceeds from those notes were applied to the

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

partial maintenance of a livestock feeding pool, known as the
;Jorwood Pool, located in Yuma, Arizona and Riverside, California.

R. 9, 73. M., 6, 76. L.; George L. Smith Deposition, p.

ll, lines 7-10.

The record further reveals that the Norwood

Pool was managed in Arizona and California by one George L.
Smith (hereinafter "Smith") or a company known as GLS Livestock
Management, Inc. which apparently was his alter ego.
~,

Smith

p. 3, lines 16-25, p. 5, lines 1-18, p. 34, lines 22-25,

p. 35, lines 1-2.
It is clear from the record that Smith at no time managed the Pool under, or subject to, defendants' supervision:
thE extent of their participation in the operation was "deciding that they either wanted to get in or they wanted to get
out

Smith Dep. , p. 21, lines 19-25, p. 25, lines 6- 7.

De-

fendants' relationship to the Pool was virtually identical to
that of a stockholder to a corporation--without a stockholder's
voting rights .
There is no evidence in the record that Smith managed
the Norwood Pool from Salt Lake City, although he did maintain
an office there. 1

1
Plaintiff offered in evidence an affidavit prepared
/ lt~ counsel and signed by Mr. Smith.
R. 66-68. L.
The af.idavi~ stated:
(a) That for several years Smith had been enfiayed in. the business of managing cattle and livestock on bea f of investors.
R. 66. L.; (b) That in 1972 he arranged to
manage defendants' investment
He did not say where that arrangement was made.
R. 66-67: L.; (c) That GLS Livestock

b .
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This Court found that defendants were subject tor,.
'

--

jurisdiction on the grounds that:
(a)

Smith was defendants' agent; and

(b)

Smith transacted "the business of buy-

ing, feeding, managing and marketing cattle
for the defendants ... in and from Salt Lake
City."

Slip Op., pp. 3-4.

Defendants respectfully submit that the record does
not reveal--and in fact the record negatives--an agency relo·
tionship between defendants and Smith.

Defendants furthers.

mit that the record does not reveal that "the business of k·
ing, feeding, managing and marketing cattle was carried on '.;:
defendants ... in and from Salt Lake City."

Insofar as the

record reveals where those acts occurred, it reveals that th<·
occurred outside of Utah.

Management, Inc.' s only office was located in Salt Lake Cit·
Utah.
R. 67. L. (However, he testified that he actuallype·
formed his management during trips to Arizona and California
Smith De~., p. 18, lines 16-25, p. 19, lines 1-25, p. 20,.
lines 1- 5, p. 21, lines 1- 7) ; ( d) That he made many. pu!C~~'.'
and sales of livestock by telephone from Salt Lake City,. '.'
0
during his business career--but he did not state that an) • .
these purchases or sales were made for Leva~i~h, Mil~er ~rec)
the Norwood Pool.
R. 67. L.
(In his depos1t1on, Sr.nth P ;. I
p 1'
att 1e ,,
fically stated that he purchased the Norwood oo s c
rr:: !
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Arizona and sold th~ c~i;,e;:
in Arizona and California--not Utah (Smith Dep., P· 1'

3-13).
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ARGUMENT

THE DECISION HEREIN HAS BASED UPON AN INCORRECT
APPLICATION OF THE LAH OF AGENCY AND OF THE UTAH
LONG-ARl1 STATUTE.

THEREFORE, REHEARING SHOULD

BE GRAlJTE D .

UTAH CODE

AN~.

§78-27-24 provides:

Any person ... who in person or through an agent
does any of the following enumerated acts, subjects himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1)

The transaction of any business
within this state;

Section 24 imposes jurisdiction upon a nonresident
onlv if he or his agent transacts business within Utah and
if a claim arises from that in-Utah transaction.

1.

George L. Smith was not defendants' "agent", as

that term authoritatively has been defined by this Court and
bv other iurisdictions.

The only means by which defendants

conceivably could have transacted business within Utah would
have been through the acts of George L. Sl'lith.

The plurality

has found that Mr. Smith, by carrying on business in Salt
Lake City on behalf of defendants, subjected them to Utah
jurisdiction pursuant to the terms of §78-27-24.

Under Sec-

tion 24, Smith's activities on behalf of defendants could
constitute "transaction of business within this State" only
if
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(a)

He were their agent; and

(b)

He acted as their agent within this

state.
This Court authoritatively defined the term "agent"
for purposes of Utah law in Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson,
15 Utah 2d 355, 358-359, 393 P.2d 391 (1964):
The line of demarcation between one who
operates as an independent contractor as opposed to one who is the servant or agent of
another is sometimes a bit blurred. This
court has on a number of occasions confronted
this problem and set forth various criteria
to be considered in making the proper classification. The most fundamental one relates to
the extent of control by the one who hires
over the one who performs the service. If the
employer's will is representated only by a desired result, the indication is of an independent contractor; whereas, if the employer exercises control over the means of accomplishing
the result, this points toward an agent or servant relationship-.
The Thiokol rule is fully in accord with a universally accepte
demarcation of agents from independent contractors.

~·,

People v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 843, 300 P.2d 760, 764
Losli v. Foster, 37 Wash. 2d 760, 222 P.2d 824, 832 (1950).
As the proponent of a claim of agency, plaintiff bore
the burden of proving that relationship.

Wilkerson v. St~:

16 Utah 2d 424, 426, 403 P. 2d 31 (1964).

However, there is

nothing whatever in the record to suggest that appellees "ec· ,
ercise[d] the control over the means of accomplishing the re·:
sul t" which Mr. Smith was to achieve.

Quite to the contrar.
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~lr.

Smith testified that his relationship with appellees was

as follows:

Q What active role, if any, did your
clients take in your cattle management business?
A Through 1974 mostly deciding that
they either wanted to get in or they wanted
to get out. That probably should be expanded
to say through 1975.

Q Was that the extent of their participation?
A They borrowed the money, provided the
funds, received the tax benefits, if any, and
generally just as I stated if they wanted in
or they wanted out.

Q Would the statement you have just made
about your clients' participation have been an
accurate description of Mr. Miller's and Mr.
Levatich's participation?
A I think it's accurate. They directed
me to--that they needed "X" tax loss and I
proceeded to generate it.
Smith Dep., p. 21, lines 19-25, p. 25, lines 1-7.
If Smith is to be deemed an agent, rather than an independent contractor, Thiokol must be repudiated.

Appellees

respectfully submit that this Court should reverse the instant
decision, rather than create such an inconsistency with a welldefined rule of law.
2.

Plaintiff has made no showing that its claim arose

3:Q.rn George L. Smith's "transaction of ... business within this
~·"

It is well established that, when personal jurisdic-

15

challenged, plaintiff bears the burden of proving the

tion
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factual basis of that claim.

Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics

Corp., 548 P. 2d 1257, 1259 (Utah 1976); McNutt v. General Mo·
tors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).

As is set

forth at pages 2-4 above, there is no evidence in the recorc
that "the business of buying, feeding, managing and marketin£
cattle was carried on for the defendants by George L. Smith
in and from Salt Lake City."
contrary.

Indeed, the evidence is to the

The instant decision accords jurisdiction to a

tiff which utterly has failed to produce a record which dernor.·
strates a factual basis for its claims.

The district court'i

decision therefore should be affirmed.
3.

Defendants' relationship to George L. Smith's op·

erations was virtually identical to that of a minor stockhok
to a corporation and should not form a basis for personal jcr·
is diction.

Mr. Smith acknowledged on the record that inves· •

tors in his cattle pools had only two options:

"deciding tbt

they wanted to get in or they wanted to get out."
p. 21, lines 19-25, p. 25, lines 1-7.

Smith~

Investors had no more

control over his operation than minor stockholders have ove
the operation of a corporation.

The plurality opinion herE''.;

stated:
Nevertheless, we acknowledge the pr~c~ica~ necessity and desirability of those 11m1tat7ons
and we have neither any intention nor desire to
Some examples which illust:;-a~e
g o beyond them.
· 1 11m1what we regard as necessary and practica
k .
tations are these: where a person buys stoc in

-8-
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a corporation, such as U.S. Steel or General
Motors, where the enterprise is located in
and carried on in another state . . . .
Sl~ • P· Z.

Defendants submit that, inasmuch as Smith's investors'
involvement in his operations was as passive and powerless as
that of minor stockholders in a corporation, the plurality's
suggested limitations should exclude them from personal jurisdiction in these premises.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and based upon the authorities cited above, defendants respectfully urge that rehearing
be granted.

DATED this 15th day of June, 1978.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
McCARTHY
RICARDO B. FERRARI
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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